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Abstract—The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is widely 
used to study the evolution of cooperation between self-
interested agents. Existing work asks how genes that code for 
cooperation arise and spread through a single-species 
population of IPD playing agents. In this paper, we focus on 
competition between different species of agents. Making this 
distinction allows us to separate and examine 
macroevolutionary phenomena. We illustrate with some species-
level simulation experiments with agents that use well-known 
strategies, and with species of agents that use team strategies. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A beguiling puzzle of biology is how cooperative behavior 
can evolve in a population of selfish organisms. Ever since 
Axelrod and Hamilton’s pioneering paper [1] in 1981, the 
simulated evolution of agents playing the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma (IPD) has been the gold standard for examining this 
question. IPD is a model that encapsulates the choices an 
organism faces regarding whether or not to cooperate with 
another organism, and the payoffs resulting from the choices 
the two organisms jointly make. A thorough coverage of the 
history and the main themes of this large body of research 
can be found in [3]. 
Many hundreds of papers on the topic have examined it 
from many directions – the effect of miscommunication, 
spatial models, multiple levels of cooperation, multiple 
players, choice of partners, signaling, selection schemes and 
so on. But in all these variations, the evolutionary process 
has been studied at the level of changing proportions of 
different alleles in a population of players. This level of 
abstraction is sometimes called “microevolution”. 
In this paper, we propose a framework for studying the 
evolution of cooperation at the level of competition between 
species, sometimes called “macroevolution”. This is the level 
better suited to consider phenomena such as speciation, 
mutualism (cooperation between species), parallel evolution, 
extinction and so on. 
The term “macroevolution” can be a controversial one. It 
is sometimes used by creationists and Intelligent Design 
proponents to split evolutionary theory into a part that 
explains variations within species (“microevolution”) and a 
part that explains larger scale phenomena, such as speciation 
(“macroevolution”). This second part then becomes a target 
to attack. We are not interested in these arguments here, and 
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we simply use “macroevolution” to refer to those phenomena 
of evolution that are best thought about at the level of 
abstraction appropriate to competition between species. 
In the rest of this paper, we first introduce the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma and discuss related work. We then 
present our simulation framework, and use it to design and 
carry out some experiments. We begin with experiments 
using simple, well-known IPD strategies, to show how the 
framework can be used, and then move on to some more 
complex, successful strategies from recent IPD contests. We 
then consider some group strategies. We conclude with a 
discussion of the results of these experiments and suggest 
possibilities for future work. 
II. ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a model used to study 
human and natural systems in which cooperation between 
self-interested individuals is observed or desired. It was 
introduced by Flood and Dresher in the early 1950’s in 
studies applying game theory to global nuclear strategies [5]. 
It has also been applied to problems in psychology, 
economics, politics, and biology. 
As PD is widely known, we refer the reader to [3] for a 
detailed description of the game, noting that we chose the 
common values T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, and S = 0. 
A case by case analysis shows that the best way for a self-
interested player to play PD is always to defect, no matter 
what the other player does. This leads us to consider the 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), in which the players play 
a sequence of games of PD against each other. 
In IPD, player strategies are rules that determine (perhaps 
stochastically) a player’s next move in any given game 
situation (which can include the history of the game to that 
point). Each player’s aim is to maximize his total payoff over 
the series. To prevent players anticipating the end of the 
series (which again leads to mutual defection), the series 
continues with some fixed probability, called the discount 
factor (so called because in a mathematical sense this is 
equivalent to an infinitely repeated game where future 
payoffs are discounted). 
Some well-known IPD strategies are: 
 
• TitForTat: cooperate on the first move, and play the 
opponent’s previous move after that; 
• Grim: cooperate on the first move, and keep 
cooperating unless the opponent defects, in which 
case, defect forever; 
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• Pavlov: cooperate on the first move, and on subsequent 
moves, switch strategies if you were punished on the 
previous move. 
Many variations of IPD have been studied, using many 
approaches. Variations include different classes of strategies, 
noisy moves, noisy payoffs, alternating non-simultaneous 
moves, signalling and so on. Approaches used include game 
theory, evolutionary methods, and machine learning. See [3] 
for a nice review covering work up to 2007. 
A. IPD Tournaments 
Around 1980, Robert Axelrod staged two round-robin 
“tournaments” between computer programs designed by 
participants to play IPD. Many sophisticated programs were 
submitted. In each case, the winner was Anil Rapaport’s 
submission, a program that simply played TitForTat. In 
1987, Axelrod carried out computer simulations using a 
genetic algorithm to evolve populations of strategies playing 
the IPD against each other [1]. In these simulations, 
TitForTat-like strategies often arose, but other, more 
complicated strategies sometimes evolved that outperformed 
TitForTat in particular populations. Axelrod used this to 
illustrate that there is no “best” strategy for playing the IPD 
in such an evolving population, because success depends on 
the mix of other strategies present in the population. 
Over the years, other tournaments have been held, 
including a series of competitions held in 2004 at the IEEE 
Congress on Evolutionary Computation, to celebrate the 20th 
anniversary of Axelrod’s 1984 book on the subject [2]. 
Controversially, competitors were allowed to enter more than 
one strategy, and some took advantage of this to enter 
strategies that colluded with each other – so called group 
strategies – in order to improve the chances of one of their 
number of winning the competition. The competitions were 
repeated at the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational 
Intelligence and Games (CIG’05), along with an extra 
competition in which group strategies were not allowed. 
III. RELATED WORK 
There are many existing examples, often ad hoc, of 
evolutionary simulations at the species level. A famous one 
is Lovelock’s Daisyworld [12], which models the interaction 
between two species of daisy and their effect on climate, 
illustrating the Gaia hypothesis. A popular subject for 
simulation is the predator-prey relationship: see, for example 
[11]. In an example closely related to our topic, Rankin et al 
[9] used a multispecies simulation to show that in a 
competition between species, the more selfish species tend to 
go extinct – at least in the scenarios they simulated (but note 
that their study did not use IPD as the vehicle for 
representing cooperative versus selfish behavior). 
Despite the common occurrence of species-level 
evolutionary simulations, we are not aware of any other 
species-level simulation studies focused on IPD. Many 
existing studies do sometimes interpret specific alleles as 
“species”, and refer to their “extinction”, for example. 
However, alleles don’t really behave like species except in 
an allegorical sense. The essential property of species that is 
missing is that species are reproductively isolated. For 
example, “extinction” is but a temporary setback for an allele 
– mutation can always bring it back to life. Similarly, a 
single mutation changes one allele to another, whereas true 
speciation is much more complex. An interesting 
contribution is this area is [4], where fitness sharing is used 
to encourage specialization of a population into species. 
There have been other IPD studies where restricted 
reproductive choices are used in a similar way, simulating 
the reproductive isolation of species to some degree. There is 
even the suggestion that IPD-like competition can help 
speciation in Nature, see, for example, [7]. 
Our experiments on group strategies were obviously 
motivated by the group strategies created for the 2004/5 IPD 
Competitions. Another approach to group-aware strategies is 
the work involving the use of tag systems to allow agents to 
recognize different player types, for example [10]. The 
approach we use here is more straightforward, but does not 
support study of issues such as mimicry and signaling. 
IV. A SIMULATION FRAMEWORK 
Evolution in Nature can be thought of as a competition 
between organisms using different survival strategies. In this 
work, we want to examine one specific aspect of evolution, 
so we need to lay out the rules of the competition. 
 Informally, here are our rules: 
 We are interested in a population of IPD playing 
agents; 
 The population consists of agents belonging to a 
number of distinct species; 
 Each species has its own specific kind of genome; 
 Agents reproduce asexually, with the child’s genes 
derived from its parents by mutation - the child is the 
same species as its parent; 
 An agent’s genes determine the strategy the agent uses 
when playing IPD; 
 An agent’s fitness is determined as the average payoff 
it receives from playing IPD games against the rest of 
the population; 
 An agent’s reproductive success is proportional to its 
fitness. 
The outcome of this competition depends on many factors: 
chance, population size, the species and their initial 
proportions in the population, as well as on how, 
specifically, the rules of the competition are operationalised. 
By manipulating some of these, we aim to understand better 
how cooperative behaviour can evolve in populations of self-
interested individuals, and what factors affect that evolution. 
We implemented this framework in Java using a 
population is made up of Organisms, each containing a 
Genotype and a Phenotype. The Genotype determines the 
species of the Organism. The Phenotype (determined from 
the Genotype) is the agent’s strategy. 




Although the framework provides for mutation, in the 
experiments reported here, we keep it simple by making 
mutation a no-op. Thus we are focused, in this initial 
exploration, on competition between species, and ignore 
competition within species. 
 
public class Organism 
{ 
    public Genotype genotype; 
    public Phenotype phenotype; 
    public double fitness; 
}  
 
public interface Genotype 
{ 
    public Genotype copy(); 
    public void mutate(); 
    public Phenotype develop(); 
} 
 
public interface Phenotype 
{ 
    public Move getFirstMove(); 
    public Move getNextMove( 
             Move oppLastMove); 
} 
We simulate the evolution of a population of Organisms as 
shown in the pseudo-code below: 
 
Inputs: Initial number of organisms of each species 
1. Create initial population of Organisms 
2. While not done do 
3.     For each pair of Organisms O1 and O2 
4.         Play O1 against O2 in a game of IPD 
5.         O1.fitness += O1’s total payoff 
6.         O2.fitness += O2’s total payoff 
7.     Start a new population 
8.     While new population not complete 
9.         Select a parent O  
10.         C = O.genotype.copy() 
11.         C.mutate() 
12.         P = C.develop() 
13.         Add a new Organism(C, P, 0) to the population 
14.     End While 
15. End While 
 
Notice that in the case where there is only one species, this 
framework reduces to the more usual kind of evolutionary 
simulation. 
A. Example – AllC, AllD and TitForTat 
We use this framework to run experiments with different 
kinds of IPD strategies, to examine the species-level 
phenomena that we can observe. To illustrate, we first 
examine some simple, well-known strategies, AllC – where 
the agent ignores its opponent and cooperates at all times, 
AllD – where the agent always defects, and TitForTat. We 
start with 20 individuals in each species. The discount rate is 
0.98, giving an average game length of 50 moves. We use 
roulette-wheel selection. Each simulation is run for 100 
generations. 
During the course of a simulation, it is possible for a 
species to go extinct. This is a key point of departure from 
typical evolutionary simulations, where all the agents are of 
the same species, and interest is in the changing proportions 
of different individual-level strategies (we refer to these as 
individual-level strategies even though they may involve 
interactions between different population sub-groups). These 
strategies never really go extinct – they can always make a 
comeback through mutation or crossover. In contrast, we are 
examining species-level interactions, where extinction is 
forever.  
In a sense, the real competition between species is to see 
who does best at survival in the long term – a short-term 
drop in population numbers doesn’t necessarily spell failure. 
However, if the population of a species drops too low, then 
an unlucky sequence of events might lead to extinction. 
There are at least three different kinds of outcomes for 
these simulations. One possibility is that only one species 
survives for the whole 100 generations. In this case, we call 
that species the sole survivor.  Another possibility is that 
more than one species lasts 100 generations. It might be that 
the surviving species have reached some kind of equilibrium 
or limit cycle, or it might be that one would be sole survivor 
if we ran the simulation longer. It is difficult for us to tell the 
difference between these last two cases. 
As the outcome of any single simulation is affected by 
chance, we run 100 simulations, and gather some statistics 
on the outcomes in terms of extinctions and sole survivors. 
Table 1 below shows the results for the present example.  
TABLE 1 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 20 
ALLC, 20 ALLD, AND 20 TITFORTAT 
 
 AllC AllD TitForTat 
extinction 83 99 11 
sole.survivor 10 1 82 
Here we see that AllD almost always goes extinct (99%), 
while AllC usually does (83%), and TitForTat only 
occasionally does (11%). It is very rare (1%) for AllD to be 
sole survivor. TitForTat is usually the sole survivor (82%). 
We can see what happens in a little more detail with a plot 
showing the mean population sizes at each generation over 
the 100 runs of the simulation, as in Figure 1. 
The plot does not show a typical run – the course of each 
individual run may be quite different – but we can see some 
general features. The number of AllD initially rises, on 
average, while AllC falls. TitForTat rises also, eventually 
suppressing the AllD population. By the time AllD is 
eliminated, TitForTat exists in higher numbers than AllC. At 
this point, the population is playing almost exclusively 
cooperatively (100% in those runs where AllD is extinct), so 
the competition becomes a kind of “random walk”, where 
everyone’s fitness is more or less equal, and stochastic 
variation causes the relative proportions to wander a little. 




This kind of result has been seen in many previous studies. 
In our species-based simulations, an unlucky sequence of 
wanderings will result in either AllD or TitForTat going 
extinct if we wait long enough, which happens in all but 7 



















Figure 1 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 20 AllC, 20 
AllD, 20 TitForTat 
If we increase the initial population to 50 of each species, 
we get the results shown in Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 50 
ALLC, 50 ALLD, AND 50 TITFORTAT 
 
 AllC AllD TitForTat 
extinction 54 100 0 
sole.survivor 0 0 54 
We see that the stochastic effects are less with a larger 
total population. TitForTat always survives, and AllD always 
goes extinct. AllC goes extinct 54% of the time, while AllC 
and TitForTat both survive the other 46% of the time. While 
we have omitted the mean numbers plot here, it is similar to 
Figure 1, with TitForTat having an average final population 
of about 125 to AllC’s 25, a ratio of about 5:1, compared 
with about 3:1 for the smaller population case. 
TABLE 3 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 100 
ALLC, 100 ALLD, AND 100 TITFORTAT 
 
 AllC AllD TitForTat 
extinction 31 100 0 
sole.survivor 0 0 31 
With starting populations of 100, the results are 
qualitatively similar, except that AllC only goes extinct 31% 
of the time after 100 generations. The final ratio of TitForTat 
to AllC is about 5:1, the same ratio as for 50 initial agents 
per species.  
V. COMPETITION ENTRIES 
In the CIG 2005 IPD Competitions, Competition 4 was a 
re-run of Axelrod’s original competition.  In particular, only 
one entry was allowed per contestant, and group strategies 
were not allowed. The form of the competition was similar to 
a single generation of one of our simulations – fitness levels 
at the end of the first generation corresponded to the final 
scores in the competition. What would happen if we were to 
continue the competition into successive generations? 
Arguable, this would test how well the strategies used in the 
competition would fare in an evolutionary context. Of 
course, these strategies were not designed to be used in this 
way, but we were interested to see the results. 
Therefore, we present here an experiment in which we use 
some of the competition entries and subject them to our 
simulation framework. For practical reasons, we have chosen 
to include only the top 4 entries, along with the “standard” 
strategy Rand, a random player, that was included in the 
competition by the organisers. The entered strategies, in the 
order they finished, are: Adaptive Pavlov (our own 
implementation, based on our best understanding of [8]), 
Omega TitForTat (the actual implementation from the 
competition), Modeller (modified for a 0.98 discount rate), 
and Gradual (the competition implementation). We started 
with 20 agents of each species. Extinction and survival 
results are shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 10 
AGENTS FROM EACH OF 13 COMPETITION STRATEGIES. 
 extinct sole.survivor 
APavlov 61 4 
OTFT 46 10 
Modeller 47 5 
Gradual 52 6 
Rand 100 0 
Thus Omega TitForTat is the winner of the species-level 
competition. The mean numbers plot, Figure 2, shows that 
Rand is quickly eliminated, and the other 4 strategies are 
closely matched. 
 
Figure 2 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 20 APavlov, 20 
OTFT, 20 Modeller, 20 Gradual and 20 Rand 
The reason APavlov does not win here may be the 
different mix of opponents (there were 50 entrants in the 
original competition), or it may be that our implementation 
of the strategy is not identical to the competition one (the 
description is ambiguous on a couple of points). 
Individual runs of the simulation look quite different from 
Figure 2. We give an example in Figure 3. On this run, 
Modeller was doing best in the first couple of generations, 
but Adaptive Pavlov caught a lucky break in generation 3. 
These two continued to be favoured by chance, with the 




other strategies dying out by generation 25. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Numbers in each generation on a single run, starting with 20 
APavlov, 20 OTFT, 20 Modeller, 20 Gradual and 20 Rand 
VI. SOME GROUP STRATEGIES 
So far we have looked at agents that do not distinguish 
between opponents – that is, agents that consider all 
opponents to be identical at the start of each new IPD game. 
In this section, we ask: what changes if agents are able to 
identify the species of the opponent. Such an ability seems 
biologically reasonable for studying species-level evolution, 
and would also be appropriate for non-biological scenarios 
in which we are interested in group strategies. 
Group strategies proved very successful under the rules of 
the 2004/5 IPD Competitions, in those competitions where 
group entries were allowed. Agents used special sequences 
in the first few moves of the game to allow members of the 
same group to recognise each other, and then to play 
differently against different players. While we could do the 
same here, it seems simpler to provide all agents with the 
innate ability to identify an opponent’s species. 
In Nature, it would often be reasonable to assume that 
organisms can identify the species of another organism, as 
long as we put aside signaling and mimicry, interesting as 
they are. 
We can accommodate group strategies by modifying our 
framework as follows, adding the opponent’s genotype class 
as another argument to the Phenotype methods: 
 
public interface Phenotype 
{ 
    … 
    public Move getFirstMove(Class oClass); 
    public Move getNextMove( 
                       Class oClass, 
                       Move oppLastMove); 
} 
 
Many different strategies have been developed for IPD, 
and the possibilities for group strategies are no doubt just as 
numerous. In the rest of this section, we consider just a 
couple of possible strategies and begin to explore the 
complexities of their interactions. 
A. Master/Slave Group Strategies 
The group strategies entered in the 2004/5 IPD 
Competitions work roughly as follows. There are two types 
of agents in a team: Master and Slave. Slaves sacrifice 
themselves for Masters, by repeatedly cooperating, allowing 
the Master to constantly defect, giving the Master the 
maximum payoff. A Slave playing another Slave cooperates. 
A Slave playing any player not in its team always defects, 
preventing the other player from getting a good payoff. A 
Master playing another Master cooperates, maximizing their 
joint payoff. A Master playing any player not in its team 
plays TitForTat (or some other good strategy), so as to 
maximize its own payoff against other players. So, for 
example, the Master’s Phenotype uses this method: 
 
public Move getNextMove(Class oClass, 
                        Move oppLastMove) 
{ 
    if(oClass == Master.class) 
        return COOPERATE; 
    else if(oClass == Slave.class) 
        return DEFECT; 
    else return oppLastMove; 
}  
These strategies were designed for the context of the 
competitions: a good strategy was to use one Master and as 
many Slaves as the competition allowed. The aim was for the 
Master to do well, and the poor outcome for the Slaves was 
of no consequence. In the context of an evolutionary contest, 
the likely consequence for the Slaves is extinction of their 
species, and it is not clear whether there would be any lasting 
benefit for the Masters. 
An alternative way to model the Master/Slave strategy 
would be to make Master and Slave different roles within a 
single species. The assignment of roles could be decided 
either socially (for example, individuals could switch 
between roles if there seem to be too many of one and not 
enough of the other), or genetically. Both of these would be 
interesting, but we have not yet attempted either. 
B.  The Clique Strategy 
A commonly observed group strategy among humans is 
that of the clique, in which members cooperate only with 
other members of the clique. Here we model this behaviour 
by creating a species that uses this strategy. So, for example, 
one method of the Clique phenotype would be: 
 
public Move getNextMove(Class oClass, 
                        Move oppLastMove) 
{ 
    if(oClass == Clique.class) 
        return COOPERATE; 
    else return DEFECT; 
} 
 
This strategy tries to give maximum assistance to clique 
members while denying succor to outsiders. An apparent 
weakness is its inability to get a good reward from outsiders 




who cannot be exploited by defection, like TitForTat. 
C. Simulation results 
We begin with some experiments to explore the 
Master/Slave strategy, by pitting some familiar strategies 
against a Master/Slave team. Let’s start with AllC. 
1) Experiment C.1 – Master/Slave versus AllC 
In this experiment, we started with 50 AllC agents, 25 
Masters and 25 Slaves. As the Master/Slave agents are acting 
as a team, we allow 50 agents to be split between Masters 
and Slaves. Table 5 gives the extinction/survival results: 
TABLE 5 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 25 
MASTER, 25 SLAVE, AND 50 ALLC 
 
 Master Slave AllC 
extinction 3 100 71 
sole.survivor 71 0 3 
As we see, the Slaves always go extinct, Masters usually 
(71%) become the sole surviving species, sometimes (26%) 
Masters and AllC both survive, and rarely (3%) AllC is the 
sole survivor. A more detailed picture is given by the Mean 


















Figure 4 – Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 25 Master, 25 
Slave, 50 AllC 
The Slaves sacrifice themselves in the first few 
generations (generally going extinct at about generation 10) 
to give the Masters and initial advantage over AllC. By that 
time Masters make up about 88% of the population, and both 
surviving species will cooperate 100% of the time from then 
on. Stochastic variation then determines which species, if 
any, goes extinct by generation 100. 
Our choice of 25 Masters and 25 Slaves was arbitrary. 
Would the team do better with more Slaves and fewer 
Masters? Perhaps starting with too few Masters would leave 
them still in the minority at the point when the Slaves go 
extinct? The next experiment examines this. 
2) Experiment C.2 – Master/Slave 5/45 versus AllC 
In this experiment, we start with 5 Masters, 45 Slaves, and 
50 AllC. Table 6 gives the extinction/survival results. We 
see that the team as a whole is more successful than before, 
with AllC going extinct in every run. Surprisingly, the Slaves 
actually out-competed the Masters in one run. How did this 




EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 5 
MASTER, 45 SLAVE, AND 50 ALLC 
 
 Master Slave AllC 
extinction 1 99 100 

























Figure 5 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 5 Master, 45 
Slave, 50 AllC 
This time, the Slaves are seen to rapidly rise to nearly 80% 
of the population, by which time AllC is almost eliminated. 
By the time AllC goes extinct, the Masters have increased to 
more than 20% of the population, and are usually (99%) able 
to assert themselves and take over from the Slaves. 
What happens if we start with more Masters? If we start 
with 45 Masters and 5 Slaves, then the Masters are sole 
survivors about 34% of the time, AllC about 17%, and the 
rest of the time, Masters and AllC both survive (with about 
66% Masters and 34% AllC). As expected, a smaller initial 
number of Masters is more effective. 
3) Experiment C.3- Master/Slave versus TitForTat 
Having disposed of AllC, we now ask how the 
Master/Slave strategy might do against a more difficult 
opponent, say TitForTat. Table 7 below gives the 
extinction/survival results for 100 runs starting with 5 
Masters, 45 Slaves, and 50 TitForTat agents. 
TABLE 7 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 5 
MASTER, 45 SLAVE, AND 50 TITFORTAT 
 
 Master Slave TitForTat 
extinction 14 99 45 
sole.survivor 44 1 13 
Here we see that the Master/Slave team is also effective 
against TitForTat, driving TitForTat to extinction almost half 
the time (45%), and going extinct only 13% of the time. The 
mean numbers plot, Figure 6, gives more detail. 
The Slaves drive down TitForTat to around 35% on 
average by the time they go extinct in about generation 10. 
As with the competitions against AllC, 100% cooperation 
then ensues, with drift causing extinction of either Master or 
TitForTat by generation 100 about 58% of the time. 



























Figure 6 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 5 Master, 45 
Slave, 50 TitForTat 
4) Experiment C.4- Clique versus AllC 
Starting with 50 Clique and 50 AllC agents, Clique drives 
AllC to extinction in about 5 generations. This is not 
surprising given AllC’s lack of defense against exploitation. 
5) Experiment C.5 – Clique versus TitForTat 
In this experiment we pit 50 Clique against 50 TitForTat 
agents. Extinction and survival rates are given in Table 8.  
TABLE 8 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 50 
CLIQUE AND 50 TITFORTAT 
 
 Clique TitForTat 
extinction 42 58 
sole survivor 58 42 
Clique has a small edge against TitForTat when they start 
with equal numbers. As Figure 7 shows, one species or the 
other is extinct by about generation 20 (we know this 


















Figure 7 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 50 Clique and 
50 TitForTat 
Clique gains its advantage over TitForTat by defecting on 
the first move of the game. The average payoffs in games 
between Clique and TitForTat (with a discount of 0.98) is 
54/50 for Clique versus 49/50 for TitForTat. This gives 
equal average payoffs over one generation when the 
proportion of Clique agents in the population is about 
48.73%. If we start the simulation with 49 Clique and 51 
TitForTat, Clique is the sole survivor about 51% of the time. 
Starting with 48 Clique and 52 TitForTat, then Clique is the 
sole survivor only about 35% of the time.  
 
6) Experiment C.6 – Master/Slave versus Clique 
In this experiment the two group strategies face off. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Clique is sole survivor 62% of the 
time, compared with Master 38% of the time. 
TABLE 9 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 5 
MASTER, 45 SLAVE, AND 50 CLIQUE 
 
 Master Slave Clique 
extinction 62 100 38 



















Figure 8 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 5 Master, 45 
Slave, and 50 Clique 
The mean numbers plot suggests an explanation. 
Comparing Figure 6 and Figure 8, we see that Clique is not 
so damaged by Slave as TitForTat is, so that Master, starting 
with low numbers,  never manages to catch up to Clique. 
7) Experiment C.7 – All in 
The success of an IPD strategy depends on the population 
it is part of, and it’s this that makes the dynamics of an 
evolutionary simulation of IPD so rich and complex. In this 
experiment we throw all our strategies together: 5 Masters, 
45 Slaves, 50 Clique, 50 TitForTat and 50 AllC.  
TABLE 10 
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL RESULTS FOR 100 RUNS STARTING WITH 5 
MASTER, 45 SLAVE, 50 CLIQUE, 50 TITFORTAT AND 50 ALLC 
 
 Master Slave Clique TitForTat AllC 
extinction 48 100 53 67 97 
sole.survivor 19 0 47 1 0 
In avoiding extinction, the Master/Slave team  just shades 
Clique, while Clique was best at eliminating the competition 
– the Clique strategy either goes extinct itself or drives the 
other strategies extinct – no live and let live here. In Figure 
9, we show the mean numbers for each species in the first 20 
generations, before full cooperation is established. 
We see that Clique and Master both increase initially, with 
Clique getting a slightly faster start. If Clique’s start is fast 
enough, and it reaches a large enough proportion of the 
population, it ruthlessly eliminates the competition. If not, 
then the hard to exploit Master and TitForTat strategies are 
together able to hold it off, and Master generally prevails by 
virtue of having a larger proportion of the population at the 
point when all the surviving species start cooperating. 





























Figure 9 - Mean numbers in each generation, starting with 5 Master, 45 
Slave, 50 Clique, 50 TitForTat and 50 AllC 
It is perhaps surprising that the very simple Clique 
strategy is such a strong contender in these contests, but we 
must remember that the outcome is very dependent on the 
initial composition of the population. 
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
These experiments illustrate that the phenomena of 
species-level evolution of cooperation are complex and 
different from those observed in single-species simulations. 
The experiments in subsection IV.A revisited the familiar 
case of competition between naïve cooperation, naïve 
defection and cooperating but non-exploitable strategies like 
TitForTat. The results are similar, with defection successful 
initially, then TitForTat punishing the defectors, allowing 
cooperation to re-establish. The difference in this case is that 
the defectors are a separate species, which goes extinct, 
leaving cooperators and TitForTat at the same fitness level, 
until one or the other drifts into extinction. 
A similar story is seen in section V, where clearly inferior 
species inevitably go extinct, and where the relative success 
of well-matched species is expressed in different extinction 
and survival rates over many simulation runs. 
The strategies in those experiments are all adaptive to 
some degree, with the Modeller strategy building an explicit 
opponent model. But they adapt only to each individual 
opponent during the course of a game. None of this learning 
carries over between opponents. Imagine instead a strategy 
that collects population statistics over a number of games 
against different opponents, and makes use of this 
information to more quickly identify an opponent’s likely 
strategy. This might allow agents to learn the characteristics 
of the other species in the population, for example. The 
evolutionary process itself provides the means for another 
kind of adaptation, at the species level. Species that mutate 
can adapt their strategies in evolutionary time, by means of 
mutation and selection, to respond to changes in the 
composition of the population. These two levels of 
adaptation would support studies of the interaction of 
learning and evolution along the lines of [6].  
In section VI, we considered group strategies, using 
species to represent groups. We found that there are group 
strategies that can do better than non-group strategies in 
some circumstances. The Master/Slave combination that was 
used in some of the 2004/5 IPD Competitions defeats 
TitForTat in a head-on contest, for example, as does the 
unsubtle Clique strategy that we introduced. A question yet 
to be explored is how such strategies might evolve. 
Our framework could be used to model various other 
macroevolutionary phenomena, such as invasion by a 
separately evolved species, coextinction and so on. However 
it does not provide for speciation. This would be an 
interesting extension. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
We have introduced a novel framework for studying the 
IPD in the context of species-level evolution. 
Within this framework, it is simple to devise experiments 
to explore specific aspects or phenomena of macroevolution. 
Some experiments have been introduced to illustrate. Using 
survival and extinction as the yardstick, interactions between 
some simple, well-known strategies were examined. We then 
re-examined some more complex strategies from the 2005 
IPD Competition. Finally, we experimented with group 
strategies, using species to represent groups. We believe that 
this framework provides a flexible and economical platform 
for simulating species-level evolution. 
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